LEADER 00000cam 2200757Ka 4500 001 ocn761220805 003 OCoLC 005 20170707103108.0 006 m o d 007 cr cnu---unuuu 008 111116s2011 miua ob 001 0 eng d 019 762102056|a766417697|a816872154|a923504399|a961561798 |a962671613|a966234363|a988460848|a992063061 020 9780472027750|q(electronic bk.) 020 0472027751|q(electronic bk.) 020 9780472900794|q(electronic bk.) 020 047290079X|q(electronic bk.) 020 |z1283334380 020 |z9781283334389 020 |z9780472117932 020 |z0472117939 024 8 9786613334381 035 (OCoLC)761220805|z(OCoLC)762102056|z(OCoLC)766417697 |z(OCoLC)816872154|z(OCoLC)923504399|z(OCoLC)961561798 |z(OCoLC)962671613|z(OCoLC)966234363|z(OCoLC)988460848 |z(OCoLC)992063061 037 333438|bMIL 037 22573/ctt1d8kjqb|bJSTOR 037 22573/ctt1qpnjnk|bJSTOR 040 N$T|beng|epn|cN$T|dE7B|dEDX|dYDXCP|dCN4X3|dOCLCQ|dDKDLA|dP @U|dOCLCF|dOCLCA|dCOO|dOCLCQ|dOCLCO|dOCL|dCDX|dIDEBK |dOCLCQ|dEBLCP|dDEBSZ|dOCLCA|dJSTOR|dOCLCQ|dAZK|dLOA |dAGLDB|dOCLCQ|dOCLCO|dCOCUF|dICA|dOCLCQ|dOCLCO|dORE |dCHVBK|dMOR|dMERER|dJSTOR|dPIFAG|dSTJ 043 e------ 049 STJJ 050 4 K3351|b.S63 2011eb 072 7 HIS010000|2bisacsh 072 7 POL011000|2bisacsh 072 7 LAW|x051000|2bisacsh 072 7 POL000000|2bisacsh 072 7 JPS|2bicssc 082 04 341.2422|222 099 WORLD WIDE WEB|aE-BOOK|aJSTOR 100 1 Slapin, Jonathan B.,|d1979- 245 10 Veto power :|binstitutional design in the European Union / |cJonathan B. Slapin. 264 1 Ann Arbor :|bUniversity of Michigan Press,|c2011. 300 1 online resource (xii, 184 pages) :|billustrations. 336 text|btxt|2rdacontent 337 computer|bc|2rdamedia 338 online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 347 data file|2rda 380 Bibliography 490 1 New comparative politics 500 GMD: electronic resource. 504 Includes bibliographical references and index. 505 0 Institutional design at IGCs -- Case selection -- Modeling institutionalism and intergovernmentalism -- Testing institutionalism and intergovernmentalism -- Winners and losers at Amsterdam -- Council votes and commissioners -- Exit threats, veto rights, and integration -- British accession : exit options and veto power. 520 Veto rights can be a meaningful source of power only when leaving an organization is extremely unlikely. For example, small European states have periodically wielded their veto privileges to override the preferences of their larger, more economically and militarily powerful neighbors when negotiating European Union treaties, which require the unanimous consent of all EU members. Jonathan B. Slapin traces the historical development of the veto privilege in the EU and how a veto--or veto threat--has been employed in treaty negotiations of the past two decades. As he explains, the importance of veto power in treaty negotiations is one of the features that distinguishes the EU from other international organizations in which exit and expulsion threats play a greater role. At the same time, the prominence of veto power means that bargaining in the EU looks more like bargaining in a federal system. Slapin's findings have significant ramifications for the study of international negotiations, the design of international organizations, and European integration. 588 0 Print version record. 610 20 European Union|xPolitics and government. 610 20 European Union. 610 27 European Union.|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst00916630 650 0 Legislative veto|zEuropean Union countries. 650 7 LAW|xInternational.|2bisacsh 650 7 HISTORY|zEurope|xGeneral.|2bisacsh 650 7 Legislative veto.|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst00995826 650 7 Politics and government.|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst01919741 651 7 Europe|zEuropean Union countries.|2fast |0(OCoLC)fst01269470 776 08 |iPrint version:|aSlapin, Jonathan B.|tVeto power.|dAnn Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 2011|z9780472117932 |w(OCoLC)731913286 830 0 New comparative politics. 914 ocn761220805 994 C0|bSTJ
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