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Author Slapin, Jonathan B., 1979-

Title Veto power : institutional design in the European Union / Jonathan B. Slapin.

Publication Info. Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 2011.

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Description 1 online resource (xii, 184 pages) : illustrations.
data file rda
Bibliography
Series New comparative politics
New comparative politics.
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references and index.
Note Print version record.
Contents Institutional design at IGCs -- Case selection -- Modeling institutionalism and intergovernmentalism -- Testing institutionalism and intergovernmentalism -- Winners and losers at Amsterdam -- Council votes and commissioners -- Exit threats, veto rights, and integration -- British accession : exit options and veto power.
Summary Veto rights can be a meaningful source of power only when leaving an organization is extremely unlikely. For example, small European states have periodically wielded their veto privileges to override the preferences of their larger, more economically and militarily powerful neighbors when negotiating European Union treaties, which require the unanimous consent of all EU members. Jonathan B. Slapin traces the historical development of the veto privilege in the EU and how a veto--or veto threat--has been employed in treaty negotiations of the past two decades. As he explains, the importance of veto power in treaty negotiations is one of the features that distinguishes the EU from other international organizations in which exit and expulsion threats play a greater role. At the same time, the prominence of veto power means that bargaining in the EU looks more like bargaining in a federal system. Slapin's findings have significant ramifications for the study of international negotiations, the design of international organizations, and European integration.
Note GMD: electronic resource.
Subject European Union -- Politics and government.
European Union.
European Union. (OCoLC)fst00916630
Legislative veto -- European Union countries.
LAW -- International.
HISTORY -- Europe -- General.
Legislative veto. (OCoLC)fst00995826
Politics and government. (OCoLC)fst01919741
Europe -- European Union countries. (OCoLC)fst01269470
Other Form: Print version: Slapin, Jonathan B. Veto power. Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 2011 9780472117932 (OCoLC)731913286
Standard No. 9786613334381
ISBN 9780472027750 (electronic bk.)
0472027751 (electronic bk.)
9780472900794 (electronic bk.)
047290079X (electronic bk.)
1283334380
9781283334389
9780472117932
0472117939
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