LEADER 00000cam  2200625 i 4500 
001    ocn900306346 
003    OCoLC 
005    20161209014443.0 
008    150127s2015    enk      b    001 0 eng   
010      2014042303 
016 7  101675709|2DNLM 
019    913566767 
020    9780199333554|q(paperback;)|q(alk. paper) 
020    0199333556|q(paperback;)|q(alk. paper) 
020    9780199333547|q(hardcover ;)|q(alk. paper) 
020    0199333548|q(hardcover ;)|q(alk. paper) 
035    (OCoLC)900306346|z(OCoLC)913566767 
040    DLC|beng|erda|cDLC|dYDX|dYDXCP|dBTCTA|dBDX|dOCLCF|dCDX
       |dDEBBG|dIDU|dA7U|dOCLCQ|dOCLCO|dNLM|dOCLCO|dGZM|dOCLCO
       |dSTJ 
042    pcc 
049    STJJ 
050 00 BJ1335|b.D42 2015 
050  4 BJ1335|b.B46 2015 
060 00 2016 B-521 
060 10 WA 550.1 
082 00 176|223 
092    176|bB456D 
100 1  Benatar, David,|eauthor. 
245 00 Debating procreation :|bis it wrong to reproduce? /|cDavid
       Benatar, David Wasserman. 
264  1 Oxford ;|aNew York :|bOxford University Press,|c[2015] 
300    vi, 269 pages ;|c23 cm. 
336    text|btxt|2rdacontent 
337    unmediated|bn|2rdamedia 
338    volume|bnc|2rdacarrier 
490 1  Debating ethics 
504    Includes bibliographical references and index. 
505 0  Introducing anti-natalism -- The asymmetry argument -- The
       quality of life argument -- The misanthropic argument -- 
       Contra procreation -- Better to have lived and lost? -- 
       Against anti-natalism -- The good of the future child and 
       the parent-child relationship as goals of procreation -- 
       Impersonal constraints on procreation -- Alternatives to 
       impersonal approaches: birthrights and role-based duties. 
520    While procreation is ubiquitous, attention to the ethical 
       issues involved in creating children is relatively rare. 
       In Debating Procreation, David Benatar and David Wasserman
       take opposing views on this important question. David 
       Benatar argues for the anti-natalist view that it is 
       always wrong to bring new people into existence. He argues
       that coming into existence is always a serious harm and 
       that even if it were not always so, the risk of serious 
       harm is sufficiently great to make procreation wrong. In 
       addition to these "philanthropic" arguments, he advances 
       the "misanthropic" one that because humans are so 
       defective and cause vast amounts of harm, it is wrong to 
       create more of them. David Wasserman defends procreation 
       against the anti-natalist challenge. He outlines a variety
       of moderate pro-natalist positions, which all see 
       procreation as often permissible but never required. After
       criticizing the main anti-natalist arguments, he reviews 
       those pronatalist positions. He argues that constraints on
       procreation are best understood in terms of the role 
       morality of prospective parents, considers different views
       of that role morality, and argues for one that imposes 
       only limited constraints based on the well-being of the 
       future child. He then argues that the expected good of a 
       future child and of the parent-child relationship can 
       provide a strong justification for procreation in the face
       of expected adversities without giving individuals any 
       moral reason to procreate. 
650  0 Human reproduction|xMoral and ethical aspects. 
650  0 Life|xMoral and ethical aspects. 
650  7 Human reproduction|xMoral and ethical aspects.|2fast
       |0(OCoLC)fst00963236 
650  7 Life|xMoral and ethical aspects.|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst00998168
650 07 Antinatalismus.|0(DE-588)1076064825|2gnd 
650 07 Ethik.|0(DE-588)4015602-3|2gnd 
650 07 Familienplanung.|0(DE-588)4113510-6|2gnd 
650 07 Fortpflanzung.|0(DE-588)4017982-5|2gnd 
650 07 Natalismus.|0(DE-588)1076065007|2gnd 
650 12 Reproductive Rights|xethics. 
650 22 Reproductive Behavior|xethics. 
650 22 Quality of Life. 
650 22 Wrongful Life|xethics. 
700 1  Wasserman, David,|eauthor. 
830  0 Debating ethics. 
994    C0|bSTJ