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050  4 UA12|b.S37 2006eb 
082 04 355/.0320973|222 
245 00 Securing tyrants or fostering reform? :|bU.S. internal 
       security assistance to repressive and transitioning 
       regimes /|cSeth G. Jones [and others]. 
264  1 Santa Monica, CA :|bRAND Corporation,|c[2006] 
264  4 |c©2006 
300    1 online resource (xxviii, 203 pages) :|billustrations 
336    text|btxt|2rdacontent 
337    computer|bc|2rdamedia 
338    online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 
500    Summary of a workshop. 
500    "Prepared for the Open Society Institute." 
504    Includes bibliographical references (pages 181-203). 
505 0  Executive Summary -- Introduction -- A Historical context 
       -- El Salvador -- Uzbekistan -- Afghanistan -- Pakistan --
       Conclusion. 
506    |3Use copy|fRestrictions unspecified|2star|5MiAaHDL 
520    The United States has provided assistance to the security 
       forces of a number of repressive states that do not share 
       its political ideals. This practice raises several 
       questions, the answers to which have significant policy 
       implications: Has U.S. assistance improved the 
       effectiveness of internal security forces in countering 
       security threats? Has it improved the accountability and 
       human rights records of these forces? What is the 
       relationship between improving security and improving 
       accountability and human rights? This study addresses 
       these questions by examining the results of U.S. 
       assistance to four states: El Salvador, Uzbekistan, 
       Afghanistan, and Pakistan. U.S. assistance to El Salvador 
       improved the accountability and human rights practices of 
       the Salvadoran police but not their effectiveness as 
       violent crime rates soared. In Uzbekistan, programs 
       focused on counterproliferation, export control, and 
       specific investigatory techniques were effective. But 
       autocracy and repression by Uzbek officials, including 
       security forces, have increased in recent years. 
       Assistance to Afghanistan has somewhat improved the 
       accountability and human rights practices of Afghan 
       security forces. The vast majority of serious human rights
       abuses in the country are now committed by insurgent 
       groups and warlords. In Pakistan, the U.S. government has 
       not paid significant attention to the implications of its 
       security assistance for the improvement of accountability 
       and human rights, in large part because these goals have 
       not been a focus of that assistance. Overall, these 
       analyses suggest that efforts to improve the effectiveness,
       human rights, and accountability of internal security 
       forces are more likely to be successful when states are 
       transitioning from repressive to democratic systems. In 
       addition, several factors are critical for success: the 
       duration of assistance, viability of the justice system, 
       and support and buy-in from the local government 
       (including key ministries). 
533    Electronic reproduction.|b[S.l.] :|cHathiTrust Digital 
       Library,|d2011.|5MiAaHDL 
538    Master and use copy. Digital master created according to 
       Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs
       and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, 
       December 2002.|uhttp://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
       |5MiAaHDL 
583 1  digitized|c2011|hHathiTrust Digital Library|lcommitted to 
       preserve|2pda|5MiAaHDL 
588 0  Print version record. 
650  0 Security Assistance Program|vCongresses. 
650  0 Military assistance, American|zEl Salvador|vCongresses. 
650  0 Military assistance, American|zUzbekistan|vCongresses. 
650  0 Military assistance, American|zAfghanistan|vCongresses. 
650  0 Military assistance, American|zPakistan|vCongresses. 
650  7 TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING|xMilitary Science.|2bisacsh 
650  7 HISTORY|xMilitary|xOther.|2bisacsh 
650  7 POLITICAL SCIENCE|xInternational Relations|xGeneral.
       |2bisacsh 
650  7 Military assistance, American.|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst01020932 
650  7 Security Assistance Program.|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst01110870 
651  7 Afghanistan.|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst01205406 
651  7 El Salvador.|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst01205530 
651  7 Pakistan.|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst01210275 
651  7 Uzbekistan.|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst01260657 
655  7 Conference papers and proceedings.|2fast
       |0(OCoLC)fst01423772 
700 1  Jones, Seth G.,|d1972- 
710 2  International Security and Defense Policy Center. 
710 2  Open Society Institute. 
776 08 |iPrint version:|tSecuring tyrants or fostering reform?.
       |dSanta Monica, CA : RAND Corp., ©2006|z9780833040183
       |z0833040189|w(DLC)  2006031744|w(OCoLC)76139356 
914    ocn184843895 
994    92|bCKE