| Description |
x, 204 pages ; 24 cm |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 184-197) and index. |
| Contents |
1. Social Existentialism. 2. Shared Attitudes. 3. Omissions and Responsibility in Groups. 4. Communities and Shared Values -- pt. 1. Attitudes, Agency, and Responsibility. 1. Existentialism, Self, and Voluntariness. 1. Responsibility and Agency. 2. Existentialism and the Self. 3. An Underground Movement in Ethics. 4. Voluntariness and Involuntariness. 2. Shared Responsibility and Racist Attitudes. 1. The Concept of Shared Responsibility. 2. Joint Ventures and Conspiracies. 3. Omissions and Risks. 4. Racist Attitudes and Risks. 5. Agency and Attitudes. 3. Insensitivity and Moral Responsibility. 1. The Concept of Sensitivity. 2. Sense and Sensitivity. 3. Insensitivity and Culpable Ignorance. 4. The Influence of Stereotypes. 5. Habits and One's Future Self -- pt. 2. Omission, Inaction, and Groups. 4. Groups and Personal Value Transformation. 1. Personal and Group Values. 2. Risking Harm and Institutional Desensitization. 3. Responsibility and Omission in Groups. |
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5. Negligence and Professional Responsibility. 1. Negligence and Due Care. 2. Integrity and Omissions. 3. Personal Guilt and Negligence. 4. Moral Integrity and Professional Negligence. 6. Collective Inaction and Responsibility. 1. Collection Action and Collective Inaction. 2. Collective Responsibility and Putative Groups. 3. Sharing Responsibility for Collective Inaction. 4. Practical and Ontological Objections. 5. Tragedy and Inactivity -- pt. 3. Communities, Roles, and Responsibilities. 7. Philosophers and Political Responsibility. 1. The Philosopher as Gadfly. 2. The Philosopher as Seeker of Wisdom. 3. The Special Responsibilities of Philosophers. 4. The Responsibilities of Philosophers as a Group. 8. Metaphysical Guilt and Moral Taint. 1. The Concept of Metaphysical Guilt. 2. Guilt and Community Membership. 3. The Case of South African Divestment. 4. Expanding the Domain of Moral Responsibility. 9. Role Conflicts, Community, and Shared Agency. 1. Roles and Conscientiousness. |
| Summary |
"Is moral responsibility limited only to the consequences of overt individual actions? Or are individuals also responsible for attitudes, inaction, and the consequences of actions taken by their communities?"--BOOK JACKET. "In this original work, Larry May argues that even when they do not directly participate, people share responsibility for various harms perpetrated by their communities. A robust theory of responsibility, May holds, must pay heed to the makeup of the self as well as to actions: not only "what we do," but in a larger sense, "who we are.""--BOOK JACKET. "Taking as its point of departure some of the insights of Hannah Arendt, May's analysis confronts mainstream theories of responsibility with the ideas of continental philosophers who demanded that specific human experience provide the grounding for philosophy. May relies here on the work of Karl Jaspers and the later Sartre concerning the self as a social construct - an interplay of history, social conditioning, and the chosen behavior of the individual. Arguing against "the retreat from responsibility" espoused by many continental and analytic moral theorists, he contrasts his views both with those of communitarianism and with those of more classical moral philosophies."--BOOK JACKET. "May anchors his theories in concrete experience, especially the experience of victims of community oppression. In the first part of Sharing Responsibility, he argues for responsibility based on an individual's attitudes. Some attitudes, he asserts, are the products of quasi-conscious deliberation over which a person exerts at least partial control. He examines the case of racism, contending that those who harbor racist attitudes in a community in which acts of racial violence have occurred share responsibility for such harms."--BOOK JACKET. "May then focuses on responsibility for individual and collective inaction. He examines the phenomenon of diffused responsibility, citing the case of Kitty Genovese. Finally, May argues for group membership - including membership in professional associations like the American Philosophical Association - as an important source of heightened personal responsibility. By attacking the problems of racism and collective inaction with an expanded notion of moral negligence, May addresses timely issues of importance to modern society."--Jacket. |
| Subject |
Responsibility.
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Social ethics.
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Social groups -- Moral and ethical aspects.
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Existential ethics.
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08.38 ethics. (NL-LeOCL)077593472
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Existential ethics. (OCoLC)fst00918196
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Responsibility. (OCoLC)fst01095857
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Social ethics. (OCoLC)fst01122447
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Social groups -- Moral and ethical aspects.
(OCoLC)fst01122486
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Gesellschaft (DE-588)4020588-5
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Individuum (DE-588)4026751-9
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Sozialethik (DE-588)4055765-0
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Verantwortung (DE-588)4062547-3
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Sociale ethiek.
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Verantwoordelijkheid.
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Verantwortung.
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Sozialethik.
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Individuum.
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Gesellschaft.
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| Indexed Term |
Ethics |
| ISBN |
0226511685 (alk. paper) |
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9780226511689 (alk. paper) |
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0226511693 |
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9780226511696 |
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