LEADER 00000cam  2200673Ii 4500 
001    ocn319888127 
003    OCoLC 
005    20170927054208.3 
006    m     o  d         
007    cr cnu---unuuu 
008    090501s2008    cauab   ob    001 0 eng d 
019    237002347|a435376088|a476261318|a519488560|a608778443
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020    9780833046406|q(electronic bk.) 
020    0833046403|q(electronic bk.) 
020    |z9780833044655|q(paperback;)|q(alk. paper) 
020    |z0833044656|q(paperback;)|q(alk. paper) 
027    RAND/MG-741-1-RC 
035    (OCoLC)319888127|z(OCoLC)237002347|z(OCoLC)435376088
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       |z(OCoLC)609213890|z(OCoLC)815768547|z(OCoLC)855308548
       |z(OCoLC)977040483|z(OCoLC)978503276|z(OCoLC)992025957 
037    22573/cttd51c|bJSTOR 
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042    dlr 
049    CKEA 
050  4 HV6431|b.J65 2008eb 
082 04 363.325/16|222 
100 1  Jones, Seth G.,|d1972- 
245 10 How terrorist groups end :|blessons for countering Al 
       Qa'ida /|cSeth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki. 
264  1 Santa Monica, CA :|bRand,|c[2008] 
264  4 |c©2008 
300    1 online resource (xxiii, 227 pages) :|billustrations, 
       maps 
336    text|btxt|2rdacontent 
337    computer|bc|2rdamedia 
338    online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 
504    Includes bibliographical references and index. 
505 0  Introduction -- How terrorist groups end -- Policing and 
       Japan's Aum Shinrikyo -- Politics and the FMLN in El 
       Salvador -- Military force and Al Qa'ida in Iraq -- The 
       limits of America's Al Qa'ida strategy -- Ending the 'war'
       on terrorism. 
506    |3Use copy|fRestrictions unspecified|2star|5MiAaHDL 
520    All terrorist groups eventually end. But how? Most modern 
       groups have ended because they joined the political 
       process or local police and intelligence agencies arrested
       or killed key members. This has significant implications 
       for dealing with al Qa'ida and suggests fundamentally 
       rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy: 
       Policing and intelligence, not military force, should form
       the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qa'ida. 
533    Electronic reproduction.|b[S.l.] :|cHathiTrust Digital 
       Library,|d2010.|5MiAaHDL 
538    Master and use copy. Digital master created according to 
       Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs
       and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, 
       December 2002.|uhttp://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
       |5MiAaHDL 
583 1  digitized|c2010|hHathiTrust Digital Library|lcommitted to 
       preserve|2pda|5MiAaHDL 
588 0  Print version record. 
610 20 Qaida (Organization) 
610 27 Qaida (Organization)|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst00763708 
650  0 Terrorism. 
650  0 Terrorism|xPrevention|xInternational cooperation. 
650  0 Intelligence service. 
650  0 Problem-oriented policing. 
650  7 POLITICAL SCIENCE|xPolitical Freedom & Security
       |xTerrorism.|2bisacsh 
650  7 POLITICAL SCIENCE|xInternational Relations|xGeneral.
       |2bisacsh 
650  7 Intelligence service.|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst00975848 
650  7 Problem-oriented policing.|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst01741114 
650  7 Terrorism.|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst01148101 
650  7 Terrorism|xPrevention|xInternational cooperation.|2fast
       |0(OCoLC)fst01148129 
700 1  Libicki, Martin C. 
776 08 |iPrint version:|aJones, Seth G., 1972-|tHow terrorist 
       groups end.|dSanta Monica, CA : Rand, ©2008|z9780833044655
       |z0833044656|w(DLC)  2008025194|w(OCoLC)231745621 
914    ocn319888127 
994    92|bCKE