| Description |
xix, 312 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 291-293) and index. |
| Contents |
International relations game : Two-person zero-sum games with saddlepoints -- Two-person zero-sum games without saddlepoints -- Pure and mixed strategies -- Interpretation of mixed strategies -- Two-person nonzero-sum games -- Prisoner's dilemma and the theor of metagames -- Chicken and the Cuban Missile Crisis. |
|
Qualitative voting games : Voting procedures -- Sincere voting -- Straightforward strategies and voting procedures -- Equilibrium choices and vulnerability -- Desirable strategies and equilibria -- The Relationship between desirable and admissible strategies -- Sophisticated voting -- Coalitions and information -- Voting on voting procedures -- The Paradox of voting. |
|
Quantitative Voting Games : Reguirements for a voting system of proportional representation -- Rules that meet the requirements -- Interdependence of the requirements -- The Effects of size -- Information and the choice of strategies. |
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Vote-trading Games : What the general possibility theorem precludes -- Judgments about vote trading -- Definitions and assumptions -- Sincere and insincere voting -- Initial trades and the paracos of vote trading -- The Consequences of refusing to trade -- The Consequences of forming coalitions -- Conditions limiting vote trading -- Empirical examples of the paradox of vote trading. |
|
Voting Power : The Shapley-Shibik index of voting power -- The Banzhof index of voting power -- Coalition models of the two power indices -- Calculation of the power indices -- Three paradoxes of voting power. |
|
Coalition Games : Power an coalitions -- Restructions on coalition alignments -- The Stability of alignments -- Empiricla conclusions of the Luce-Rogow model -- The Concept of winning -- The Size principle -- The Information effect -- Criticisms of the size principle -- As Alternative goal : maximizing one's share of the spoils. |
|
Election Games : The Need for models to assess the consequences of electoral reform -- Presidential campaigns and voting behavior -- The Goals of the candidates -- The Popular-vote model -- The Electoral vote model -- The 3/2's allocation rule -- Why the large states are favored -- Testing the models -- Campaign allocations and biases through 1980 -- Limitatios and extensions of the models. |
| Subject |
Political science -- Mathematical models.
|
|
Game theory.
|
|
Coalitions.
|
|
Coalitions. (OCoLC)fst01430055
|
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Game theory. (OCoLC)fst00937501
|
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Political science -- Mathematical models.
(OCoLC)fst01069815
|
|
Politik (DE-588)4046514-7
|
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Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8
|
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Politieke wetenschappen.
|
|
Speltheorie.
|
|
Politik.
|
|
Spieltheorie.
|
| Other Form: |
Online version: Brams, Steven J. Game theory and politics. New York : Free Press, [1975] (OCoLC)613154626 |
| ISBN |
0029045509 |
|
9780029045503 |
|
