LEADER 00000cam  2200517Li 4500 
001    ocm47009102  
003    OCoLC 
005    20160518075431.7 
006    m     o  d         
007    cr cn||||||||| 
008    010324s1997    enka    ob    001 0 eng d 
019    533222956|a776949778 
020    9780511583315|q(electronic bk.) 
020    0511583311|q(electronic bk.) 
020    0511002718|q(electronic bk.) 
020    9780511002717|q(electronic bk.) 
035    (OCoLC)47009102|z(OCoLC)533222956|z(OCoLC)776949778 
040    N$T|beng|epn|erda|cN$T|dOCL|dOCLCQ|dYDXCP|dOCLCG|dOCLCQ
       |dE7B|dFTU|dTUU|dOCLCQ|dTNF|dOCLCQ|dOCLCF|dNHA|dNLGGC
       |dOCLCQ|dAUD|dOCLCQ 
049    GTKE 
050  4 B105.I56|bJ33 1997eb 
082 04 128/.2|220 
100 1  Jacob, Pierre,|d1949- 
245 10 What minds can do :|bintentionality in a non-intentional 
       world /|cPierre Jacob. 
264  1 Cambridge ;|aNew York :|bCambridge University Press,
       |c1997. 
300    1 online resource (xii, 299 pages) :|billustrations. 
336    text|btxt|2rdacontent 
337    computer|bc|2rdamedia 
338    online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 
490 1  Cambridge studies in philosophy 
504    Includes bibliographical references (pages 281-294) and 
       index. 
505 0  Introduction -- part I. The naturalization of 
       intentionality. What is intentional realism? -- 
       Introduction to informational semantics -- Three problems 
       for informational semantics -- Information and teleology -
       - part II. The causal role of intentionality. The 
       computational representational theory of mind (CRTM) -- 
       Must an intentional realist be a meaning atomist? -- 
       Functionalism and the threat of preemption -- Explaining 
       intentional behavior -- Conclusion: a postlude on 
       semantics and psychology. 
520    Some of a person's mental states have the power to 
       represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have 
       semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to 
       find a naturalistic or non-semantic basis for the 
       representational powers of a person's mind, and to show 
       that these semantic properties are involved in the causal 
       explanation of the person's behavior. In the process, the 
       book addresses issues that are central to much 
       contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of interest 
       to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind and 
       language, cognitive science, and psychology. 
588 0  Print version record. 
650  0 Intentionality (Philosophy) 
650  0 Philosophy of mind. 
650  7 PHILOSOPHY|xMind & Body.|2bisacsh 
650  7 Intentionality (Philosophy)|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst00975963 
650  7 Philosophy of mind.|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst01060840 
650 17 Semantiek.|2gtt 
650 17 Intentionaliteit.|2gtt 
776 08 |iPrint version:|aJacob, Pierre, 1949-|tWhat minds can do.
       |dCambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1997
       |z0521574013|w(DLC)   96014157|w(OCoLC)34548692 
830  0 Cambridge studies in philosophy. 
914    ocm47009102 
994    93|bGTK