Skip to content
You are not logged in |Login  
     
Limit search to available items
Book Cover
Bestseller
BestsellerE-Book
Author Higashijima, Masaaki, author. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8002-7128 https://ror.org/01dq60k83

Title The dictator's dilemma at the ballot box electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies / Masaaki Higashijima.

Publication Info. Ann Arbor, Michigan : University of Michigan Press, [2022]
©2022

Copies

Location Call No. Status
 All Libraries - Shared Downloadable Materials  JSTOR Open Access Ebook    Downloadable
All patrons click here to access this title from JSTOR
 University of Saint Joseph: Pope Pius XII Library - Internet  WORLD WIDE WEB E-BOOK JSTOR    Downloadable
Please click here to access this JSTOR resource
Description 1 online resource (xxiii, 345 pages) : illustrations (49 figures, 49 tables).
data file rda
Series Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies
Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies series.
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references (pages 301-324) and index.
Contents Part I. Puzzles and arguments -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. A theory of autocratic elections -- Part II. Cross-national explorations -- Chapter 3. Blatant electoral fraud -- Chapter 4. Institutional manipulation -- Chapter 5. Economic maneuvering -- Chapter 6. Backfiring at the Ballot Box -- Part III. Comparative case studies -- Chapter 7. From electoral manipulation to economic maneuvering: Nazarbaev's Kazakhstan -- Chapter 8. From electoral manipulation to autocratic breakdown: Akaev's Kyrgyzstan -- Chapter 9. Conclusion.
Summary Modern dictatorships hold elections. Contrary to our stereotypical views of autocratic politics, dictators often introduce elections with limited manipulation wherein they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud and pro-regime electoral institutions. Why do such electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box explores how dictators design elections and what consequences those elections have on political order. It argues that strong autocrats who can effectively garner popular support through extensive economic distribution become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition's stunning election victories. The book's theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics--Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The book's findings suggest that indicators of free and fair elections in dictatorships may not be enough to achieve full-fledged democratization.
Funding Sponsored by Knowledge Unlatched
Note This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Description based on information from the publisher.
Subject Elections -- Corrupt practices -- Case studies.
Elections -- Corrupt practices -- Kazakhstan.
Elections -- Corrupt practices -- Kyrgyzstan.
Dictatorship -- Case studies.
Dictatorship -- Kazakhstan.
Dictatorship -- Kyrgyzstan.
Dictatorship. (OCoLC)fst00892878
Elections -- Corrupt practices. (OCoLC)fst00904333
Kazakhstan. (OCoLC)fst01260664
Kyrgyzstan. (OCoLC)fst01260659
POLITICAL SCIENCE / General.
Genre/Form Case studies. (OCoLC)fst01423765
Added Author Michigan Publishing (University of Michigan), publisher.
Added Title Electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies
ISBN 9780472902750 open access electronic book
047290275X open access electronic book
Standard No. 10.3998/mpub.11978139 doi
-->
Add a Review