Includes bibliographical references (pages 219-243) and index.
Contents
Framing the reorientation -- A troubled history -- Revisiting counterinsurgency -- Innovation under fire -- Counterinsurgency and the QDR -- FM 3-24 and Operation Fardh Al-Qanoon -- The ambivalence of the "Surge" -- Innovation or intertia -- Conclusion: kicking the counterinsurgency syndrome?
Summary
Confronting insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has recognized the need to "re-learn" counterinsurgency. But how has the Department of Defense with its mixed efforts responded to this new strategic environment? Has it learned anything from past failures? In The New Counterinsurgency Era, David Ucko examines DoD's institutional obstacles and initially slow response to a changing strategic reality. Ucko also suggests how the military can better prepare for the unique challenges of modern warfare, where it is charged with everything from providing security to s.