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100 1  Zagare, Frank C. 
245 10 Perfect deterrence /|cFrank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour.
264  1 Cambridge, UK ;|aNew York, NY :|bCambridge University 
       Press,|c[2000] 
264  4 |c©2000 
300    1 online resource (xxii, 414 pages) :|billustrations. 
336    text|btxt|2rdacontent 
337    computer|bc|2rdamedia 
338    online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 
490 1  Cambridge studies in international relations ;|v72 
504    Includes bibliographical references. 
505 0  Classical deterrence theory -- Rationality and deterrence 
       -- Credibility and deterrence -- Uncertainty and mutual 
       deterrence -- Unilateral deterrence -- Modeling extended 
       deterrence -- Modeling massive retaliation -- Modeling 
       flexible response -- Limited war, crisis escalation, and 
       extended deterrence -- Perfect deterrence theory. 
520 8  An important and timely contribution to International 
       Relations and political science, this is the first general
       analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. 
       Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a 
       new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), 
       which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-
       deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence 
       relationships supported by deployment policies such as 
       Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors 
       focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences,
       credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding 
       of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions 
       emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to 
       attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that 
       incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. 
       With the application of deterrence theory in diverse 
       social settings, and historical examples from before, 
       during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a 
       welcome new examination of the subject. 
588 0  Print version record. 
650  0 Deterrence (Strategy) 
650  7 HISTORY|xMilitary|xNuclear Warfare.|2bisacsh 
650  7 Deterrence (Strategy)|2fast|0(OCoLC)fst00891658 
650 07 Abschreckung.|2swd 
650 17 Afschrikking (polemologie)|2gtt 
700 1  Kilgour, D. Marc. 
776 08 |iPrint version:|aZagare, Frank C.|tPerfect deterrence.
       |dCambridge, UK ; New York, NY : Cambridge University 
       Press, ©2000|w(DLC)   99088000 
830  0 Cambridge studies in international relations ;|v72. 
914    ocm50061494 
994    93|bGTK