| Description |
xv, 396 pages : illustrations ; 26 cm |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 385-388) and index. |
| Contents |
Part I: Rational decision making. The single-person decision problem -- Introducing uncertainty and time -- Part II: Static games of complete information. Preliminaries -- Rationality and common knowledge -- Pinning down beliefs: Nash equilibrium -- Mixed strategies -- Part III: Dynamic games of complete information. Preliminaries -- Credibility and sequential rationality -- Multistage games -- Repeated games -- Strategic bargaining -- Part IV: Static games of incomplete information. Bayesian games -- Auctions and competitive bidding -- Mechanism design -- Part V: Dynamic games of incomplete information. Sequential rationality with incomplete information -- Signaling games -- Building a reputation -- Information transmission and cheap talk -- Mathematical appendix. |
| Subject |
Game theory.
|
| ISBN |
9780691129082 (hbk. : acid-free paper) |
|
0691129088 (hbk. : acid-free paper) |
|
