| Description |
1 online resource |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| Note |
Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed September 24, 2018). |
| Summary |
How can we think about things in the outside world? There is still no widely accepted theory of how mental representations get their meaning. In light of pioneering research, Nicholas Shea develops a naturalistic account of the nature of mental representation with a firm focus on the subpersonal representations that pervade the cognitive sciences. |
| Contents |
Machine generated contents note: Part I -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1.A Foundational Question -- 1.2. Homing In on the Problem -- 1.3. Existing Approaches -- 1.4. Teleosemantics -- 1.5. Challenges to Teleosemantics -- 2. Framework -- 2.1. Setting Aside Some Harder Cases -- 2.2. What Should Constrain Our Theorizing? -- 2.3. Externalist Explanandum, Externalist Explanans -- 2.4. Representation Without a Homunculus -- 2.5. What Vehicle Realism Buys -- 2.6. Pluralism: Varitel Semantics -- Part II -- 3. Functions for Representation -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2.A Natural Cluster Underpins a Proprietary Explanatory Role -- 3.3. Robust Outcome Functions -- 3.4. Stabilized Functions: Three Types -- a. Consequence etiology in general, and natural selection -- b. Persistence of organisms -- c. Learning with feedback -- d.A `very modern history' theory of functions -- 3.5. Task Functions -- 3.6. How Task Functions Get Explanatory Purchase -- a. Illustrated with a toy system -- b. Swamp systems -- 3.7. Rival Accounts |
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Note continued: 3.8. Conclusion -- 4. Correlational Information -- 4.1. Introduction -- a. Exploitable correlational information -- b. Toy example -- 4.2. Unmediated Explanatory Information -- a. Explaining task functions -- b. Reliance on explanation -- c. Evidential test -- 4.3. Feedforward Hierarchical Processing -- 4.4. Taxonomy of Cases -- 4.5. One Vehicle for Two Purposes -- 4.6. Representations Processed Differently in Different Contexts -- a. Analogue magnitude representations -- b. PFC representations of choice influenced by colour and motion -- 4.7. One Representation Processed via Two Routes -- 4.8. Feedback and Cycles -- 4.9. Conclusion -- 5. Structural Correspondence -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. The Cognitive Map in the Rat Hippocampus -- 5.3. Preliminary Definitions -- 5.4. Content-Constituting Structural Correspondence -- a. Exploitable structural correspondence -- b. Unmediated explanatory structural correspondence -- 5.5. Unexploited Structural Correspondence |
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Note continued: 5.6. Two More Cases of UE Structural Correspondence -- a. Similarity structure -- b. Causal structure -- 5.7. Some Further Issues -- a. Exploiting structural correspondence cannot be assimilated to exploiting correlation -- b. Approximate instantiation -- c. Evidential test for UE structural correspondence -- 5.8. Conclusion -- Part III -- 6. Standard Objections -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. Indeterminacy -- a. Aspects of the problem -- b. Determinacy of task functions -- c. Correlations that play an unmediated role in explaining task functions -- d. UE structural correspondence -- e. Natural properties -- f. Different contents for different vehicles -- g. The appropriate amount of determinacy -- h.Comparison to other theories -- 6.3.Compositionality and Non-Conceptual Representation -- 6.4. Objection to Relying on (Historical) Functions -- a. Swampman -- 6.5. Norms of Representation and of Function -- a. Systematic misrepresentation |
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Note continued: b. Psychologically proprietary representation -- 6.6. Conclusion -- 7. Descriptive and Directive Representation -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. An Account of the Distinction -- 7.3. Application to Case Studies -- a. UE information -- b. UE structural correspondence -- 7.4.Comparison to Existing Accounts -- 7.5. Further Sophistication -- a. More complex directive systems -- b. Another mode of representing -- 7.6. Conclusion -- 8. How Content Explains -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.2. How Content Explains -- a. Explanatory traction in varitel semantics -- b. Non-semantic causal description? -- c. Doing without talk of representation -- d. Other views about the explanatory purchase of content -- 8.3. Causal Efficacy of Semantic Properties -- 8.4. Why Require Exploitable Relations? -- 8.5. Ambit of Varitel Semantics -- a. Representation only if content is explanatory? -- b. Are any cases excluded? -- 8.6. Development and Content -- 8.7. Miscellaneous Qualifications |
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Note continued: 8.8. How to Find Out What Is Represented -- 8.9. Differences at the Personal Level. |
| Local Note |
Oxford University Press Oxford University Press Open Access Books |
| Language |
English. |
| Subject |
Cognitive science.
|
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Cognitive neuroscience.
|
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Cognitive science.
|
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PSYCHOLOGY -- Cognitive Psychology.
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SCIENCE -- Cognitive Science.
|
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Cognitive neuroscience. (OCoLC)fst00866540
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Cognitive science. (OCoLC)fst00866547
|
| Indexed Term |
contemporary philosophy. |
|
cognitive sciences. |
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mental representations. |
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cognitive neuroscience. |
| Other Form: |
Print version: 0198812884 9780198812883 (OCoLC)1029645803 |
| ISBN |
9780192542199 (electronic book) |
|
0192542192 (electronic book) |
|
9780191850677 |
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0191850675 |
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9780198812883 |
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0198812884 |
|
