| Description |
xi, 570 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm. |
| Series |
The Princeton economic history of the Western world |
|
Princeton economic history of the Western world.
|
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 507-548) and index. |
| Contents |
If stable and efficient banks are such a good idea, why are they so rare? -- The game of bank bargains -- Tools of conquest and survival : why states need banks -- Privileges with burdens : war, empire, and the monopoly structure of English banking -- Banks and democracy : Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries -- Crippled by populism : U.S. banking from colonial times to 1990 -- The new U.S. bank bargain : megabanks, urban activists, and the erosion of mortgage standards -- Leverage, regulatory failure, and the subprime crisis -- Durable partners : politics and banking in Canada -- Mexico : chaos makes cronyism look good -- When autocracy fails : banking and politics in Mexico since 1982 -- Inflation machines : banking and state finance in imperial Brazil -- The democratic consequences of inflation-tax banking in Brazil -- Traveling to other places : is our sample representative? -- Reality is a plague on many houses. |
| Summary |
"Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries--but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents due to unforeseen circumstances. Rather, these fluctuations result from the complex bargains made between politicians, bankers, bank shareholders, depositors, debtors, and taxpayers. The well-being of banking systems depends on the abilities of political institutions to balance and limit how coalitions of these various groups influence government regulations. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation. Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why some endure while others are undermined, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues."--Publisher's description. |
| Subject |
Banks and banking -- History.
|
|
Bank failures -- History.
|
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Credit -- History.
|
|
Bank failures. (OCoLC)fst00826658
|
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Banks and banking. (OCoLC)fst00826867
|
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Credit. (OCoLC)fst00882525
|
| Genre/Form |
History. (OCoLC)fst01411628
|
| Added Author |
Haber, Stephen H., 1957-
|
| ISBN |
9780691155241 (hardcover ; alk. paper) |
|
0691155240 (hbk. ; acid-free paper) |
|
