LEADER 00000cam  2200577Ma 4500 
001    ocn797002627 
003    OCoLC 
005    20171029042900.0 
006    m     o  d         
007    cr cn||||||||| 
008    070508s2011    caua    ob    001 0 eng d 
020    9780833058973|q(electronic bk.) 
020    0833058975|q(electronic bk.) 
027    RAND/MG-1128/3-NAVY 
035    (OCoLC)797002627 
037    |c$22.00|fpaperback 
037    22573/ctt36std9|bJSTOR 
040    COO|beng|epn|cCOO|dOCLCO|dJSTOR|dOCLCQ|dTEF|dOCLCQ|dLND
       |dSTJ 
043    e-uk--- 
049    STJJ 
050  4 V9333|b.L4373 2011eb 
082 04 623.825/7|223 
099    WORLD WIDE WEB|aE-BOOK|aJSTOR 
245 00 Learning from experience.|nVolume III,|pLessons from the 
       submarine programs of the United Kingdom's Astute 
       submarine program /|cJohn F. Schank [and others]. 
246 30 Lessons from the submarine programs of the United 
       Kingdom's Astute submarine program 
264  1 Santa Monica, CA :|bRAND,|c2011. 
300    1 online resource (xxii, 81 pages) :|bcolor illustrations 
336    text|btxt|2rdacontent 
337    computer|bc|2rdamedia 
338    online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 
500    "RAND National Defense Research Institute." 
500    "This research was conducted within the Acquisition and 
       Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense 
       Research Institute"--Pg. IV. 
504    Includes bibliographical references (pages 79-81). 
505 0  Introduction -- History of British Submarine Programs -- 
       Setting the Requirements -- Acquisition and Contracting 
       Strategy -- Designing and Building the Astute -- 
       Integrated Logistics Support -- Lessons Identified from 
       the Astute Program. 
520    Large, complex submarine design and construction programs 
       demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities 
       supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of 
       expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences 
       for successful program management, the United Kingdom's 
       Ministry of Defence (MOD) asked the RAND Corporation to 
       develop a set of lessons learned from its Astute submarine
       program that could help inform future program managers. 
       RAND reviewed the history of UK nuclear submarines, 
       investigated how operational requirements were set for the
       Astute class; explored the acquisition, contracting, 
       design, and build processes that the Astute program 
       employed; and assessed the plans and activities 
       surrounding integrated logistics support for the Astute. 
       The impact of the substantial time gap between the design 
       and build of the Astute and its predecessor nuclear 
       submarines was greatly underestimated by the private 
       sector and the MOD, and both parties underestimated the 
       impact of the MOD's decision to shift responsibilities to 
       the private sector. Designing and building a submarine 
       requires careful management and oversight and a delegation
       of roles and responsibilities that recognizes which party-
       -the shipbuilder or the government--is best positioned to 
       manage risks. 
610 10 Great Britain.|bMinistry of Defence|xProcurement. 
650  0 Nuclear submarines|zGreat Britain|xPlanning. 
650  0 Nuclear submarines|zGreat Britain|xDesign and 
       construction. 
650  0 Shipbuilding industry|zGreat Britain|xManagement. 
700 1  Schank, John F.|q(John Frederic),|d1946- 
700 1  LaCroix, F. W. 
700 1  Murphy, Robert E. 
700 1  Ip, Cesse. 
700 1  Arena, Mark V. 
700 1  Lee, Gordon T. 
710 2  Acquisition and Technology Policy Center. 
710 2  Rand Corporation. 
710 1  Great Britain.|bMinistry of Defence. 
994    C0|bSTJ