LEADER 00000cam 2200613Ii 4500 001 ocn871205298 003 OCoLC 005 20170927055253.1 006 m o d 007 cr ||||||||||| 008 140228s2014 caua obt 000 0 eng d 020 9780833085535|q(electronic bk.) 020 0833085530|q(electronic bk.) 035 (OCoLC)871205298 037 22573/ctt5vhjnp|bJSTOR 040 DID|beng|erda|cDID|dYDXCP|dCOO|dJSTOR|dCUI|dOCLCQ|dINU 043 n-us---|aa-pk---|aa-ph--- 049 CKEA 050 4 U241|b.W38 2014 082 04 355.02/180973|223 088 RAND RR513 100 1 Watts, Stephen|q(Stephen Baldwin) 245 10 Countering others' insurgencies :|bunderstanding U.S. small-footprint interventions in local context /|cStephen Watts, Jason H. Campbell, Patrick B. Johnston, Sameer Lalwani, Sarah H. Bana. 264 1 Santa Monica, CA :|bRAND,|c2014. 300 1 online resource (xxiv, 226 pages) :|billustrations. 336 text|btxt|2rdacontent 337 computer|bc|2rdamedia 338 online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 490 1 RAND Corporation research report series ;|vRR513 504 Includes bibliographical references (pages 201-226). 505 0 Introduction -- Counterinsurgency in Comparative Perspective -- Quantitative Analysis of Counterinsurgency -- Counterinsurgency in the Philippines -- Counterinsurgency in Pakistan -- Managing Troubled Partnerships -- Appendix: Coding Notes. 520 This study examines the counterinsurgency strategies and practices adopted by threatened regimes and the conditions under which U.S. "small-footprint" partnerships are likely to help these governments succeed. The report's findings are derived from a mixed-method research design incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Simple statistical analyses are applied to a dataset of counterinsurgencies that have terminated since the end of the Cold War (72 in all), and more in-depth analyses are provided of two recent cases of U.S. partnerships with counterinsurgent regimes, in the Philippines and Pakistan. The quantitative analysis finds that the cases of small- footprint U.S. operations that are commonly touted as "success stories" all occurred in countries approximating a best-case scenario. Such a verdict is not meant to deny the importance of U.S. assistance; rather, it is meant to highlight that similar U.S. policies with less promising partner nations should not be expected to produce anywhere near the same levels of success. The majority of insurgencies have taken place in worst-case conditions, and in these environments, counterinsurgent regimes are typically unsuccessful in their efforts to end rebellion, and they often employ violence indiscriminately. The case studies of the Philippines and Pakistan largely reinforce the findings of the quantitative analysis. They also highlight the challenges the United States faces in attempting to influence partner regimes to fight counterinsurgencies in the manner that the United States would prefer. The study concludes with policy recommendations for managing troubled partnerships. 536 "The research described in this report was sponsored by the Smith Richardson Foundation ..." 588 0 Online resource; title from PDF title page (RAND, viewed on October 28, 2014). 650 0 Counterinsurgency|xGovernment policy|zUnited States. 650 0 Counterinsurgency|zPhilippines. 650 0 Counterinsurgency|zPakistan. 651 0 United States|xMilitary relations. 651 0 United States|xMilitary relations|zPhilippines. 651 0 Philippines|xMilitary relations|zUnited States. 651 0 United States|xMilitary relations|zPakistan. 651 0 Pakistan|xMilitary relations|zUnited States. 700 1 Campbell, Jason H. 700 1 Johnston, Patrick B. 700 1 Bana, Sarah H. 700 1 Lalwani, Sameer. 710 2 Rand Corporation.|bNational Security Research Division, |eissuing body. 776 08 |iPrint version:|aWatts, Stephen (Stephen Baldwin). |tCountering others' insurgencies.|dSanta Monica, California : RAND, [2014]|z9780833084040|w(DLC) 2014005201|w(OCoLC)871186949 830 0 Research report (Rand Corporation) ;|vRR513. 914 ocn871205298 994 92|bCKE
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