LEADER 00000cam  2200709Ma 4500 
001    ocn797002630 
003    OCoLC 
005    20171029043220.0 
006    m     o  d         
007    cr cn||||||||| 
008    070508s2011    cau     ob    001 0 eng d 
019    801380157 
020    9780833058980|q(electronic bk.) 
020    0833058983|q(electronic bk.) 
027    RAND/MG-1128/4-NAVY 
035    (OCoLC)797002630|z(OCoLC)801380157 
037    |c$20.00|fpaperback 
037    22573/ctt36t6mj|bJSTOR 
040    COO|beng|epn|cCOO|dOCLCO|dOCLCA|dAU@|dJSTOR|dOCLCQ|dTEF
       |dOCLCQ|dLND|dSTJ 
043    u-at--- 
049    STJJ 
050  4 V9334|b.L4373 2011eb 
082 04 359.03|223 
099    WORLD WIDE WEB|aE-BOOK|aJSTOR 
245 00 Learning from experience|nVolume IV,|pLessons from 
       Australia's Collins submarine programs /|cJohn F. Schank 
       [and others]. 
246 30 Lessons from Australia's Collins submarine programs 
264  1 Santa Monica, CA :|bRAND,|c2011. 
300    1 online resource (xxvi, 59 pages) 
336    text|btxt|2rdacontent 
337    computer|bc|2rdamedia 
338    online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 
500    "RAND National Defense Research Institute." 
500    "This research was conducted within the Acquisition and 
       Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense 
       Research Institute"--Pg. IV. 
504    Includes bibliographical references (pages 57-59). 
505 0  Introduction -- History of Australia's Submarine Fleet -- 
       Setting the Requirements: Evolutionary Versus 
       Revolutionary Approach -- Contracting and Acquisition 
       Strategy -- Designing and Building the Collins-Class 
       Vessels -- Lessons from the Collins Program. 
520    Large, complex submarine design and construction programs 
       demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities 
       supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of 
       expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences 
       for successful program management, the Australian 
       government asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of 
       lessons learned from its Collins submarine program that 
       could help inform future program managers. Collins was the
       first submarine built in Australia. RAND investigated how 
       operational requirements were set for the Collins class; 
       explored the acquisition, contracting, design, and build 
       processes that the program employed; and assessed the 
       plans and activities surrounding integrated logistics 
       support for the class. Although Australia had intended to 
       take an evolutionary approach in procuring the Collins 
       class by using an existing design, no design was suitable,
       so the program pursued a developmental platform and a 
       developmental combat system. This introduced a high degree
       of risk into the program, particularly in the combat 
       system technology. Among the important lessons: All 
       appropriate organizations should be involved in a new 
       submarine program from its inception, the majority of the 
       design drawings should be completed before construction 
       begins, and a thorough and adequate testing program should
       be developed. Because designing and building a submarine 
       is one of the most complex undertakings for a new program,
       they require careful management and oversight. 
610 10 Australia.|bDepartment of Defence|xProcurement. 
610 20 Collins Class (Submarine) 
650  0 Submarines (Ships)|zAustralia|xPlanning. 
650  0 Submarines (Ships)|zAustralia|xDesign and construction. 
650  0 Shipbuilding industry|zAustralia|xManagement. 
653  0 Submarines 
653  0 Shipbuilding 
653  0 Program management 
653  0 Royal Australian Navy 
653  0 Defence planning 
653  0 Government contracts 
653  0 Government purchasing 
653  0 Reviews of research 
700 1  Schank, John F.|q(John Frederic),|d1946- 
700 1  Ip, Cesse. 
700 1  Kamarck, Kristy N. 
700 1  Murphy, Robert E. 
700 1  Arena, Mark V. 
700 1  LaCroix, F. W. 
700 1  Lee, Gordon T. 
710 2  Acquisition and Technology Policy Center. 
710 2  Rand Corporation. 
710 1  Australia.|bDepartment of Defence. 
994    C0|bSTJ